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United States v. Causey: The Fifth Circuit Gives the
Green Light to Pretextual Arrest
Johnny and Shelley D. are suspected by the local police department
of committing a recent bank robbery. They are both well respected
members of the community who, unfortunately, have recently fallen on
bad times. Neither has a prior felony conviction, nor has either been
arrested for any offense. However, the police have been tipped off by
a local informant that these two are the persons who committed the
bank robbery in question.
The police desire to bring Johnny and Shelley in for questioning
regarding this robbery, but they have no probable cause to detain them.
There are no witnesses who identified them at the scene; their fingerprints
were not found at the bank; and their automobile does not fit the
description of the car used in the robbery. Further, the police have not
observed any unusual activity by them after the robbery.
One of the investigating police officers decides to run a random
search of the police records to find anything that may permit the arrest
of the couple. By chance, the detective discovers that Johnny and Shelley
each have one outstanding parking ticket. Consequently, Johnny and
Shelley are arrested for the outstanding parking tickets and brought to
the police station for questioning. However, the line of questions by
the police does not concern the'parking tickets. On the contrary, they
are questioned only about the bank robbery which they allegedly com-
mitted.
The media is tipped off that Johnny and Shelley have been arrested
for the bank robbery and the headlines read: "Pillars of Local Com-
munity Taken into Custody for Questioning About Bank Robbery."
Although they are subsequently released and never prosecuted, the re-
putations of Johnny and Shelley are forever marred in their community.
Certainly, this sounds like an outlandish hypothetical involving fic-
titious characters. However, after the recent en banc decision of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in United States
v. Causey,l a situation such as that presented above is no longer outside
the realm of possibility.
Copyright 1989, by LOUISIANA LAw REvIEw.
1. 834 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir. 1987) (en bane).
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On December 19, 1985, Capital-Union Savings and Loan in Baton
Rouge, Louisiana, was robbed of $1,800 by a man wearing a baseball
cap and sunglasses. An investigation was begun by Baton Rouge Police
Officer Bart Thompson and Federal Bureau of Investigation (F.B.I.)
Special Agent James Watson. Police Sergeant Sid Newman of Baton
Rouge "CRIME-STOPPERS" fame telephoned the investigators advising
them that a reliable female informant had called stating that Reginald
James Causey had committed the robbery. The informant gave Newman
Causey's address and a description of his automobile, which Newman
gave to Thompson and Watson. However, Newman did not provide
them with the name of the informant or any other information to prove
her reliability.
Thompson and Watson subsequently checked the records of the
State Motor Vehicle Registration Bureau and found that the automobile
described by the informant was not registered in the name of Reginald
Causey but, rather, to another person named Causey. In addition, the
address provided was that of Reginald Causey's parents.
Officer Thompson also obtained an arrest history of Causey. The
physical description of Causey provided in the arrest history matched
that given by a bank teller. More importantly, the arrest history indicated
that Causey had previously been convicted of bank robbery. This in-
formation led Officer Thompson to "stake out" the house of Causey's
parents, but neither the vehicle nor Causey appeared.
The next day Thompson and his partner, Officer Michael Morris,
began to ponder ways in which they could pick Causey up for questioning
regarding the recent bank robbery. The officers knew that they lacked
probable cause to arrest Causey for the bank robbery and thus if Causey
did not want to talk to them, they could not force him to do so.
As the officers considered methods by which Causey could be de-
tained, "someone thought of looking in the City Court warrant book.''2
In the book, the officers discovered that, in 1978, a warrant had been
issued for Causey's arrest for failure to appear in court on a misdemeanor
theft charge. Although the prescriptive period on the misdemeanor theft
had expired,' the failure to appear charge had not, as there is no such
statute of limitations within which a failure-to-appear charge must be
prosecuted. In addition, because the arrest warrant was for failure-to-
appear, Causey would not be entitled to bail if arrested. Officer Thomp-
son subsequently contacted the city court judge who had issued the
warrant to insure its validity and to notify the judge that Causey would
soon be arrested on that warrant.
2. 818 F.2d 354, 355 (5th Cir.), rev'd on rehearing, 834 F.2d 1179 (1987) (en banc).
3. See La. Code Crim. P. art. 572.
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On Monday, December 23, at 10:30 a.m., Officers Thompson and
Morris located Causey and placed him under arrest for the failure-to-
appear warrant. Once placed in the police car, Causey was given his
Miranda warnings. Causey was then asked if he understood his rights,
and he responded that he did.
There is conflicting testimony as to what transpired thereafter. It is
Causey's contention that once in the car, one of the police officers
stated, "[Y]ou know that what we picked you up on isn't going to
stick .... Well, you know it's not going to stick but you can come
off of that. And besides, I want to talk to you about something else."
4
The officers, however, categorically denied making those statements, and
contended they never considered the warrant to be invalid.'
Once at the police station, Causey was again read the Miranda
warnings, and the officers testified that they obtained an oral waiver
from Causey of his right to counsel. Causey, however, testified that
when the police asked him to authorize a search of his belongings at
his parents' house, he asked Officer Thompson for an attorney, stating,
"could I have-would I be allowed a chance to have an attorney in
my presence to help me answer these type of questions which he was
asking me." To this, Causey stated Thompson responded, "'well, that
wouldn't matter because whether [you] gave [me] consent or not, [I]
could go through a judge, which would just take a couple of hours
longer, get a warrant and [I] would be able to go out and search the
house anyway."' '6
In addition, Causey testified that Thompson "began to use black
statements like, 'the district attorney is going to ... prosecute you and
bring forth [the] Habitual Criminal Act ... which means ... an au-
tomatic life sentence. .... ,,,7
Causey then testified that although he denied involvement in the
bank robbery, the police pressured him into discussing it by using
statements such as .'"[well, we know you did it,"' and "'[we feel you
did it."'8 Further, Causey testified that the station house supervisor,
Lieutenant Ronnie Alford, told him the following:
From what I hear, they have an armed robbery case against
you and it looks bad .... It'll be your third felony conviction
and ... the D.A.'s office is definitely going to prosecute and
ask for the Habitual Criminal Act .... [Y]ou're going to be
found guilty because of your background .... What I rec-
4. 818 F.2d at 356.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
ommend to you is that you ... let me call the F.B.I. ... in
and you give them a confession and take the matter into federal
court. That way, you would only face twenty years instead of
[the] Habitual Criminal Act, a life sentence. 9
In addition, Causey stated that Lt. Alford 'promised that if Causey
confessed to the F.B.I., Alford would ""personally call the D.A.'s office
and get them to drop charges of one count of armed bank robbery
'p10 "i
Contrary to Causey'g testimony, Officers Thompson and Morris
denied that Causey ever indicated a desire to terminate questions; ever
requested to speak to a lawyer or have a lawyer present; ever received
any promises or threats; or was ever subjected to any form of coercion.
Similarly, Lt. Alford testified that he 'only discussed with Causey
his background, a subject he routinely discussed with criminal suspects
held at'the station. Alford stated that the bank robbery was not discussed
between them. However, 'Officer Thompson contradicted Lt. AlfOrd and
testified that Alford had indeed questioned Causey about the*bank
robbery." '.
'Lt* Alford also',testified that he did not call the F.B.I. on his own
volition, but rather'.telephoned the F.B.I. only upon the'sugje0tofiof
Causey. However, Lt. Alford later changed his position and stated that
he, 'not Causey, initially suggested calling the F.B.I.' The government
admitted this fact as true in its memorandum in opposition t6 the
suppression motion.12
Lt. Alford called F.B.I. Special Agent Watson to come to the station
and take 'a confession from Causey. Alford told Watson that" Causey
wanted to make-a confession to the bank robbery although Causey had
made no prior admissions. Watson gave Causey a written Miranda
warning and Waiver form, and then read the warning to him aloud. In
addition, Special Agent Watson testified that he specifically asked Caus'ey
whether the local police had made any. deals With him or if Causey had
been thireateiied- or promised anything. Watson testified' that Causey
answered in the negative." 
-
Watson -asked -Causey several more questions -and: then drafted a
confession 'which Causey signed between 2:00' and 2:30 p.m. Causey
argued that he signed the confession: .
[tlo get the situation-get the "matter 'i t of the 'state's hands,
totally .. .', '[b]ecause!'I'm fully aware of the state gysteihere.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. 818 F.2d at 357.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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And it's a bad situation for a guy in my behalf (sic); background
alone could-I mean, evidence doesn't have to be anything in
the state system.' 4
Before the trial, Causey's lawyer moved to suppress Causey's state-
ments, both written and oral, for the following reasons: 1) coercion
and improper influence; 2) violation of the right to counsel; 3) unlawful
detention; and 4) illegal pretextual arrest based on the bench warrant,
arguing that the arrest was a pretext and the warrant in question had
prescribed. The trial judge, John V. Parker, denied the motion reasoning
that the warrant was valid when issued and remained valid until exe-
cuted. I5
Causey professed his innocence at trial, relying on his alibi of
babysitting at his parents' house when the robbery occurred. The jury,
however, found Causey guilty of one count of bank robbery.'
6
On May 22, 1987, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit, composed of Judges Alvin B. Rubin, Henry A.
Politz, and Irving L. Goldberg, reversed Judge Parker, holding that
Causey's fourth amendment rights had been violated by the pretextual
arrest. The panel further found Causey's confession inadmissible as a
"fruit of the poisonous tree.'
' 7
In reviewing the admissibility of the confession of Causey, the panel,
in an opinion by Judge Rubin, stated the issue as follows:
[wihether a confession obtained as a result of an arrest made
pursuant to a valid warrant is admissible if the arrest was made
solely to enable the police to interrogate a suspect about another,
unrelated matter and the arresting officer had no intention that
the suspect be prosecuted for the crime on which the arrest was
based. "8
The court noted that the arresting officers' "sole reason to make
the arrest was to gain the opportunity for custodial interrogation of
Causey regarding the bank robbery."' 9 Indeed, the officers admitted at
trial to arresting Causey for this pretextual purpose, as illustrated by
the following excerpt:
Q. Officer Morris, the only thing I wanted to clear is-is that
the only reason y'all took [Causey] into custody was to take
him downtown and continue your investigation of this bank
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. 818 F.2d at 362.
18. Id. at 358.
19. Id. at 356.
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robbery, is that correct?
A. Yes, sir; our objective is not to serve city court warrants.
Q. I understand that.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And generally, you don't even fool with those city court
warrants?
A. In general; no sir.
Q. So your only purpose in taking Mr. Causey into custody
on this bench warrant was an investigatory one?
A. Yes, sir.20
The court then reviewed the relevant United States Supreme Court
and Fifth Circuit jurisprudence to determine whether a confession ob-
tained under a pretextual arrest is admissible as evidence. Although the
Supreme Court has provided that "subjective intent alone 'does not
make otherwise lawful conduct illegal or unconstitutional," '21 the Fifth
Circuit noted that the Supreme Court has also stated that there was
''no suggestion whatever that this standard procedure . . . was a pretext
concealing an investigatory police motive.' '22
The Fifth Circuit panel, relying on the above language, found that
"the arrest, and hence the seizure, of Causey could not have been
objectively reasonable, because the objective facts and circumstances
would not have justified any officer in making the arrest. The arrest
was made only to avoid operation of the fourth amendment.' '23
The court then looked to its own jurisprudence to determine whether
this confession, obtained as the result of a pretextual arrest, was ad-
missible. The court primarily relied on Amador-Gonzalez v. United
States24 which held that "a confession obtained as a result of a search,
conducted after the pretextual arrest of the defendant for a minor traffic
offense, was procured in violation of the fourth amendment and must
be suppressed. '"25 The panel noted the existence of a contrary holding
in the circuit, 26 but felt bound to follow the Amador-Gonzalez case.
Consequently, the court held that Causey's pretextual arrest violated his
fourth amendment rights.
The panel finally examined whether the provision of several Miranda
warnings to Causey dissipated the taint of his illegal arrest. The court
20. Id.
21. Id. at 358 (footnote omitted) (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 136,
98 S. Ct. 1717, 1723, reh'g denied, 438 U.S. 908, 98 S. Ct. 3127 (1978)).
22. Id. at 358-59 (footnote omitted) (quoting South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S.
364, 376, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 3100 (1976)).
23. 818 F.2d at 359.
24. 391 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1968).
25. 818 F.2d at 360.
26. See United States v. Cavallino, 498 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1974).
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noted that the only possible intervening factors between the illegal arrest
and the confession were the Miranda warnings. The court held the
warnings were not sufficient intervening events to dissipate the taint of
Causey's illegal arrest. Consequently, the panel held that the confession
given by Causey was the fruit of his illegal arrest
27 and should be
excluded from evidence.
Shortly thereafter, the Fifth Circuit granted a rehearing en banc.
28
At the rehearing, 29 a divided Fifth Circuit held that the confession was,
indeed, admissible even though the arrest was admittedly a pretext to
question Causey about the bank robbery.30 After briefly restating the
facts, Judge Gee attacked the panel's reliance on a 'continuing line
of Fifth Circuit authority,' that unless an arrest is made with the
appropriate subjective intent, it is invalid and whatever results from it
is 'tainted."' 3 Judge Gee noted that the most recent of these cases was
over nine years old, and, since that time, the Supreme Court "has made
plain that it is irrelevant what subjective intent moves an officer in
taking such action as this; what signifies is the officer's actions, ob-
jectively viewed in light of the circumstances confronting him.' '32
Judge Gee did not address the Fifth Circuit cases relied upon by
the panel, instead dismissing them in a footnote, stating that "[tIhis
'continuing line of Fifth Circuit authority' . . . is drawn with vanishing
ink; the closer one looks at the cases, the less meets the eye."
33 He
stated that the cases34 relied upon did not provide a "continuing line
of Fifth Circuit authority," and even if they did, later Supreme Court
cases have provided otherwise.
The en banc majority relied on three Supreme Court cases for its
finding that the confession was admissible even though it was the product
of a pretextual arrest. The first of these cases is Scott v. United States,
35
in which the majority argued that the Supreme Court rejected consid-
eration of an officer's subjective state of mind. The Fifth Circuit based
its conclusion on the following language:
27. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S. Ct. 407 (1963).
28. See 822 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1987).
29. 834 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir. 1987).
30. The en banc opinion was written by Judge Gee in which Chief Judge Clark and
Judges Reavley, Garwood, Jolly, Higginbotham, and Davis concurred. The dissents con-
sisted of Judges Rubin, Politz, Goldberg, Randall, Johnson and Williams.
31. 834 F.2d at 1181.
32. Id. at 1182.
33. Id. at n.6 (citation omitted).
34. See United States v. Cruz, 581 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc); United States
v. Tharpe, 536 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc); and Amador-Gonzalez v. United
States, 391 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1968).
35. 436 U.S. 128, 98 S. Ct. 1717 (1978).
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[Ailmost without exception in evaluating alleged violations
of the Fourth Amendment the Court has first undertaken an
objective assessment of an officer's actions in light of the facts
and circumstances then known to him.
We have since held that the fact that the officer does not
have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons
which provide the legal justification for the officer's action does
not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances
viewed objectively, justify that action.3 6
The majority then looked to United States v. Villamonte-Marquez.17
There the Supreme Court reversed a Fifth Circuit decision upholding a
drug conviction. In that case, customs officers had boarded a large
sailboat supposedly to inspect the ships documents, as permitted by 19
U.S.C. § 1581(a). The defendants contended that the customs officers,
accompanied by a local law enforcement official, had acted on an
informant's tip that drugs were aboard, thus preventing reliance on the
statute by the officers because of the lack of a "pure heart" by the
law enforcement officials. The en banc majority found that the Supreme
Court had dismissed this argument in a footnote, stating that '[t]his
line of reasoning was rejected in a similar situation in Scott .... and
we again reject it."' 3
The majority also relied on Maryland v. Macon,3 9 in which police
officers purchased allegedly obscene materials from an adult bookstore
with marked money. There the defendants argued that "[w]hen the
officer subjectively intends to retrieve the money while retaining the
magazines, .. . the purchase is tantamount to a warrantless seizure.'"'4
In dismissing this argument, the Supreme Court stated:
This argument cannot withstand scrutiny. Whether a Fourth
Amendment violation has occurred "turns on an objective as-
sessment of the officer's actions in light of the facts and cir-
cumstances confronting him at the time," . . . and not on the
officer's actual state of mind at the time the challenged action
was taken. 4'
36. 834 F.2d at 1183 (citing Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. at 137-38, 98 S. Ct.
at 1723) (emphasis by Fifth Circuit; citations omitted).
37. 462 U.S. 579, 103 S. Ct. 2573 (1983).
38. 834 F.2d at 1183-84 (citing United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. at
584 n.3, 103 S. Ct. at 2577 n.3).
39. 472 U.S. 463, 105 S. Ct. 2778 (1985).
40. 834 F.2d at 1184 (citing Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. at 470-71, 105 S. Ct. at
2782-83) (emphasis by Fifth Circuit; citations omitted).
41. Id. (citing Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. at 470-72, 105 S. Ct. at 2783).
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The majority in Causey relied on these three cases to find that the
officers had reasonably relied on the outstanding arrest warrant, and
that their subjective intent was of no moment. The majority then over-
ruled Amador-Gonzalez insofar as it was inconsistent with their rehearing
decision. Finally, the majority stated what it considered to be the correct
rule:
[W]hile a showing of objectively reasonable good faith on the
part of police officers will ordinarily redeem honest errors and
prevent the application of the exclusionary rule, in a case where
the officers have taken no action except what the law objectively
allows their subjective motives in doing so are not even relevant
to the suppression inquiry. And the reason lies in the purpose
of that rule: to deter unlawful actions by police. Where nothing
has been done that is objectively unlawful, the exclusionary rule
has no application and the intent with which they acted is of
no consequence.4 2
Although Judge Gee accuses Judge Rubin of citing a line of authority
drawn "with invisible ink," it is suggested that Judge Gee, not Judge
Rubin, is guilty of sleight of hand. Indeed, Judge Gee's treatment of
the Amador-Gonzalez case implies that the panel, in that case, did not
find that the pretextual arrest rendered the subsequent search illegal,
when in fact the pretextual arrest did precisely that.
In Amador-Gonzalez, two detectives from the Narcotics Division of
the El Paso Police Department suspected that the defendant possessed
narcotics. The detectives did not, however, have probable cause to arrest
him on that charge. One detective continued to observe the defendant
for approximately an hour and several times saw him make a left turn,
onto a two-way street, unlawfully cutting into the wrong lane. The
detective decided to stop the defendant's car and called for another
police car. The police cars followed the defendant for five blocks before
making the arrest, and clocked him going thirty-six miles an hour in a
thirty mile an hour zone.
When Gonzalez was stopped, a detective asked him for his driver's
license, which he did not have. The officers then asked him for his
passport or local crossing card upon learning that Gonzalez was from
Juarez, Mexico.
The detectives searched Gonzalez's car and found three grams of
heroin. He was subsequently arrested and also ticketed for the traffic
offenses. Later, at the police station, Gonzalez confessed to participation
in a drug ring. Gonzalez was never booked on the traffic offenses.
The Fifth Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Wisdom, held the arrest
was merely a pretext to search the defendant's car. Indeed, the court
42. Id. at 1184-85 (citation omitted).
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stated that "[tihe arrest must not be a mere pretext for an otherwise
illegitimate search." ' 43 The court further stated that the "search must
have some relation to the nature and purpose of the arrest."44 The court
went on to state that although the arrest may have been legal, it could
not provide the foundation for the subsequent search. In the words of
the court:
In the circumstances of this case, the arrest, no matter how
lawful in itself, cannot support the search. It is clear from the
testimony of [one of the arresting detectives] that the real purpose
for making the arrest was to search the defendant's car.
45
Significantly, the court was swayed by the fact that narcotics officers
generally do not make arrests, nor do they carry ticket books. In the
opinion of the court, these detectives took unusual measures to arrest
Gonzalez in order to search his automobile. As a result, the court held
that this arrest was, in fact, pretextual and therefore the search was
invalid.
While it is true, as Judge Gee noted, that the other panel judges,
Judges Coleman and Godbold, concurred in the result only, it should
be noted that the result was that the arrest was pretextual, thus rendering
the search illegal. Indeed, Judge Coleman stated that "the decisive point
is that as to traffic violations the arrest in this case was pretextual."
46
Further, Judge Godbold stated that "[t]here was probable cause for the
traffic arrest, but the acknowledged motive for making the arrest was
to search the car for narcotics .... [S]uch a search is invalid, and the
evidence obtained from the search and the incriminating statement which
is the fruit thereof must be suppressed.1 47 Neither Judge Coleman nor
Judge Godbold wanted to express an opinion on the validity of the
arrest. However, both believed that the arrest was pretextual and that
the search incident thereto was invalid.
Another Fifth Circuit case decided in 1987 also provides a foundation
for the illegality of pretextual arrests. In United States v. Johnson,
4
the defendant was convicted of fraudulent possession of credit card
account numbers in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(3). In Johnson,
federal secret service agents received information indicating that the
defendant had been engaged in counterfeiting credit cards. During their
investigation of Johnson, the agents were informed of an outstanding
California warrant for the defendant's arrest for possession of counterfeit
43. 391 F.2d 308, 313 (5th Cir. 1968) (citations omitted).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 314.
46. Id. at 319.
47. Id.
48. 815 F.2d 309 (5th Cir. 1987).
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credit cards. 49 Subsequently, Johnson was arrested, taken into custody,
searched, and his car was inventoried. The body search and inventory
searches yielded an altered credit card and other relevant evidence.
In affirming the conviction, a Fifth Circuit panel addressed Johnson's
claim that the arrest was pretextual. The court stated the test for
pretextual arrests as follows:
A pretextual search can occur, for example, where police
discover evidence in a search incident to or an inventory fol-
lowing an arrest for an offense which the officer would have
simply ignored but for his desire to search. When a defendant
alleges that an arrest was pretext to conduct an otherwise im-
permissible search, the appropriate inquiry is whether a reason-
able officer would have made the arrest absent an illegitimate
motive to search. If a reasonable officer would not have made
the arrest absent illegitimate motive, then the resulting search
incident to or inventory is unlawful. 0
The court held that the arrest and search of Johnson was not illegal
because, although the secret service generally has no interest in executing
state arrest warrants, this warrant was for crimes closely connected to
the one upon which they desired to arrest Johnson.
Therefore, Judge Gee notwithstanding, the Fifth Circuit has, in fact,
consistently considered the subjective state of mind of an arresting officer
in the pretextual arrest context. This theory was not one dreamed up
by Judge Rubin and supported by little jurisprudence. On the contrary,
Judge Rubin relied on a long and firmly established legal principle of
the Fifth Circuit.
In addition, although Judge Gee posits that the Supreme Court has
eliminated the arresting officer's subjective motivation, the Court has
yet to announce this principle. Indeed, although Judge Gee relies on
Scott v. United States"1 and United States v. Robinson 2 as eliminating
the subjective element of the pretextual analysis, the language relied
upon states merely that:
[Tihe fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which
is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justifi-
cation for the officer's action does not invalidate the action
taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify
that action.5"
49. Id. at 316.
50. Id. at 315 (citations and footnotes omitted).
51. 436 U.S. 128, 98 S. Ct. 1717 (1978).
52. 414 U.S. 218, 94 S. Ct. 467 (1973).
53. 436 U.S. at 138, 98 S. Ct. at 1723.
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Further, in Robinson the court stated that "[wie think it is sufficient
for purposes of our decision that respondent was lawfully arrested for
an offense, and that Jenks' placing him in custody following that arrest
was not a departure from established police department practice." '54 In
addition, Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion, stated that the arrest
may be invalidated if the defendant can prove that he was taken into
custody "only to afford a pretext for a search."
Scott and Robinson do not stand for the proposition that the officer's
subjective motivation is never to be considered, as Judge Gee suggests.
Rather, these cases state that if the circumstances are objectively jus-
tifiable, then the subjective intent of the officer is not to be considered.
This is a far cry from a total elimination of the consideration of the
officer's subjective intent. As yet, the Supreme Court has not decided
a case in which the arresting officers acted in an unjustifiably pretextual
manner. Consequently, the issue of consideration of the state of mind
of the arresting officer is still unsettled.
The Supreme Court further confused the issue in Colorado v. Ber-
tine,5 where the defendant was legally arrested for drunk driving. The
defendant was taken into custody, and his van was impounded. Sub-
sequently, the police conducted an inventory search of the van. In the
process, the police officers opened a closed backpack and discovered
cocaine.
In upholding the legality of the inventory search, the Court, in an
opinion by Justice Rehnquist, stated that "[iln the present case, ...
there was no showing that the police . . .acted in bad faith or for the
sole purpose of investigation."56 The Court later noted that "[tihere
was no showing that the police chose to impound Bertine's van in order
to investigate suspected criminal activity." '5 7
It is clear that the Supreme Court has not eliminated the element
of the officer's state of mind. Indeed, as Professor LaFave notes, this
language possibly invites "a broader, Gonzalez-type approach" to pre-
textual arrest analysis. 8
Therefore, although the en banc Fifth Circuit majority purports to
be in line with the Supreme Court, that is not the case. On the contrary,
the prior panel opinion written by Judge Rubin is a more correct
statement of the law. An officer's state of mind is, in fact, to be
considered when the circumstances viewed objectively, do not justify the
police conduct.
54. 414 U.S. at 221 n.1, 94 S. Ct. at 470 n.1.
55. 479 U.S. 367, 107 S. Ct. 738 (1987).
56. Id. at 372, 107 S. Ct. at 742.
57. Id. at 376, 107 S. Ct. at 743.
58. 3 LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 7.5(d)
(2d ed. Supp. 1988).
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Do the actions of the police detective in Causey, viewed objectively,
justify the search? Did the police act in bad faith? These officers
admittedly arrested Causey in bad faith. They had no intention to
question or prosecute him on the outstanding bench warrant. In fact,
the statute of limitations for the underlying crime had run. Causey was
never prosecuted on the outstanding warrant. Further, the detectives
stated in court that their only purpose in arresting Causey was to question
him, while in custody, about the bank robbery, a crime for which they
did not have probable cause to arrest Causey. Finally, the detectives
stated that, in general, they never arrest people on city court warrants.
Is this bad faith? It is this writer's opinion that these detectives
clearly acted in bad faith with their sole purpose in arresting Causey
being investigatory. Can their actions be justified viewing the circum-
stances objectively? Not in this author's opinion. The officers admittedly
stepped outside of their ordinary procedure to execute a city court bench
warrant for failure-to-appear on a crime that had prescribed.
Certainly, we all want to see criminals arrested and put in jail.
However, violating the fourth amendment in attempting to achieve this
goal is an injustice against society that cannot be condoned. As Judge
Wisdom profoundly stated in Amador-Gonzalez, "The Bill of Rights is
a basic premise on which our system of law and order rests. It is
engraved on the conscience of the court, to be heeded in a narcotics
case no less than in any other case." 5 9 Mr. Causey, like any citizen of
the United States, deserves the protection of the fourth amendment.
Although we may strongly desire to punish the guilty, that punishment
must be implemented in a constitutionally permissible fashion. To permit
the circumvention of a constitutionally guaranteed right is to take the
first step toward the elimination of constitutionally guaranteed rights as
a whole.
C. Caldwell Herget Huckabay
59. 391 F.2d 308, 319 (5th Cir. 1968).
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